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ABSTRACT
The United States emerged from World War II asthe
acknowledged global leader in basic scienceand its industrial
application. While U.S. science has beenable to maintain that
preeminence in most areas, the nation'stechnological lead has
met increasingly formidable challenges fromabroad. Although the
evidence on recent U.S. performance is mixed, other nations,and
especially Japan, have clearly gained ground in high-technology
production and trade. The future of U.S. high-technology
production has thus emerged as a major focusof public policy.
This paper reviews the recent performance of U.S. high-techology
industries, examines possible motives underlying government
policies to promote high-technology production,and offers some
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At the close of World War II, the United States emerged as
the acknowledged global leader in both science and its industrial
application. While U.S. science has been able to maintain that
preeminence in most areas, the nation's technological lead has
met increasingly formidable challenges from abroad. Today, a
number of U.S. high-technology industries have already lost their
accustomed positions in world markets; a growing share of the
commercial benefits from major U.S. scientific advances are now
captured by foreign rather than American producers.
In the postwar period, U.S. excellence in science and
technology has been vital not only to the dramatic rise in living
standard enjoyed by most Americans, but also to national security
and the central role of the United States in the western
alliance. The erosion of the nation's technological superiority
therefore calls into question the ability of the United States to
sustain its leadership role in global institutions. Competitors
abroad, understandably proud of their recent gains at the expense
of a once-invincible economic and military rival, are at the same
time uneasy about the wider implications for international
stability of waning U.S. hegemony.2
The future of U.S. high-technology industries has thus
emerged as a major focus of public policy. This paper examines
the recent performance of U.S. high-technology industries and
policy options for maintaining or improving that performance.
Section I reviews postwar trends in U.S. performance relative to
major competitors abroad and the implications of these trends for
U.S. trade. Section II analyzes the distinctive economic
features of high-technology industries and evaluates the
potential costs and benefits from policies to promote high-
technology production. Section III presents an approach for
evaluating policy alternatives. Section IV sums up implications
of a diminished U.S. lead in science and technology for U.S.
international competitiveness and national well-being.3
I.Trends in U.S. performance
Three decades have passed since the Soviet Union shocked
complacent Americans with the successful launch of Sputnik. The
Soviet triumph touched off a prolonged wave of national soul-
searching but also stimulated coherent national action. Moving
quickly- from collective humiliation to new levels of resource
commitment, Americans became the first people to walk on the face
of the moon.
• Until the 1980s, the commercial challenges to U.S.
technological supremacy were less dramatic. Although other U.S.
manufacturing industries gradually lost their share of foreign
and even domestic markets to competitors abroad, high-technology
production appeared to be largely immune.1 The U.S. trade
balance on other manufactured goods had already moved into
deficit by 1970, but the overall balance on trade in high-
technology products continued to grow.
The balance of trade in high-technology products
Despite some significant losses on particular goods, the
U.S. trade surplus in high-technology manufactured products rose
from $6.1 billion in 1970 to $26.6 billion in 1980. Net trade in
other manufacturing followed an opposite trend, with the deficit
on U.S. trade in non-high-technology products growing from $3.8
1High-technology industries are usually defined either in
terms of the proportion of "professional, technical, ind kindred"
workers in total employment or the ratio of research and
development expenditures to total sales.4
billion in 1970 to $9.2 billion by 1980 (Table 1).
But 1980 proved to be a turning point for U.S. performance
in high-technology trade. The surplus generated by high-
technology products narrowed in each subsequent year, falling to
$3.6 billion by 1985. The deterioration was less marked than in
other manufacturing industries, where by 1985 the deficit had
reached an astonishing level of $111 billion. However, the
pattern was similar, with deterioration of U.S. performance in
almost every product category and in almost every major trading
relationship.
For both high-technology and non-high-technology trade, the
declining balances have reflected primarily surging U.S. imports
rather than falling U.S. exports. In high-technology trade, the
value of U.S. expo.rts nearly doubled between 1978 and 1985 -- but
imports more than tripled over the same period. For non-high-
technology manufactures, the contrast between export and import
growth was even more dramatic, with the value of exports rising
from $66.6 billion in 1978 to $93.5 billion in 1985 while imports
soared from $90.6 billion to $204.6 billion.
The relatively minor reduction in the U.S. high-technology
trade surplus in comparison to the marked decline in performance
of mature industries is a reflection of continuing U.S.
leadership in many high-technology sectors. Producers in the
United States operate at a substantial labor-cost disadvantage
relative to most trading partners, and the impact of this cost
disadvantage on U.S. sales is greatest where comparable goods are5
available from a number of sources worldwide. The U.S. cost
disadvantage was exacerbated in the first half of the 1980s by
the rising international value of the dollar.
But in the high-technology field, the United States remains
the sole source of many leading-edge goods (and services). For
these products, labor costs and exchange rates therefore play a
smaller role in determining U.S. trade performance. Even so,
high costs of U.S. production can influence the decision of U.S.
firms. to establish subsidiaries abroad. The main "foreign't
competition for U.S. high-technology products often comes from
affiliates of U.S. companies.
The U.S. share in world exports
U.S. shares in world production or world exports likewise
confirm a decline in the U.S. relative position. This is true
both in manufacturing overall and in high-technology
manufacturing. Part of this decline can be attributed to the
influence of "temporary" macroeconomic factors, especially the
huge U.S. budget deficit. However, it also reflects a process
that can be expected to continue and even to accelerate: an
increase in the number of nations with the knowledge base and the
industrial capacity to quickly absorb and apply new technologies.
In 1950, the United States accounted for more than 40
percent of total world output and about 17 percent of world
exports. By 1980, the U.S. share in global output had dwindled
to 22 percent and its exports to 11 percent. These data are used6
by Bhagwati and Irwin (1987) to establish a striking parallel
between the postwar decline in U.S. global dominence and the
relative decline of Britain in the nineteenth century.
However, the use of 1950 as a base year for the comparison
may exaggerate the decline in relative economic strength of the
United States. As Baldwin (1984) points out, the period
immediately after World War II was itself atypical. The United
States had emerged from the war with greatly expanded productive
capacity, while its erstwhile adversaries and allies alike had
sustained extensive losses of capital and manpower. Every U.S.
manufacturing industry was able to show a trade surplus, a
situation that masked the relative weakness of some. U.S. shares
of world activity just after the war were significantly above the
corresponding measures for the period just before the war. The
U.S. share of total exports of the ten most important industrial
countries was 35 percent as late as 1952, while it had been only
26 percent in 1938 and 28 percent in 1928.
Looking specifically at national shares in total world
exports of high-technology products, the U.S. share has actually
risen in recent years and by 1984 was less than two percentage
points below its 1965 level (25.2 percent versus 27.5 percent;
see Table 2). The dramatic change in the global market has been
the increase in the Japanese share, which rose from 7.3 percent
in 1965 to 20.2 percent in 1984. However, the Japanese gains
have come primarily at the expense of other nations, notably the
United Kingdom, rather than the United States. Table 3 shows7
that in 1984 the United States retained relative strength in most
technology-intensive product groups but had declined to a minor
presence in radio and TV receiving equipment, a category
dominated by the Japanese with almost 80 percent of total world
exports. These trends indicate that the major change in patterns
of global competition in high-technology products has been less
the decline of the United States than the rise of Japan.
Declining U.S. competitiveness?
Moreover, because the usual indicators of U.S. market losses
take no account of the concomitant rise in U.S.-controlled
production abroad, these indicators may overstate the decline of
the United States as an economic power.2The U.S. share of
world manufactured exports fell from over 17 percent in 1966 to
less than 14 percent by 1983. However, the global share of U.S.
multinational firms remained unchanged over almost two decades,
with gains in exports of majority-owned foreign affiliates
compensating for declines in exports from parents (Lipsey and
Kravis, 1985, 1986). Thus, while U.S. manufactured exports are
indeed losing their share of world markets, to a great degree
they are losing it not to foreign competitors but to themselves,
i.e., to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.3
2Similar arguments apply in the case of the United
Kingdom and other European nations with extensive direct
investments abroad.
Of course some U.S. sectors did better than the average
while others lost ground to foreign competitors. The largest
loss of export-market share both for U.S. production and for U.S.8
This evidence suggests that much of the current discussion
of declining U.S. competitiveness does not fit the facts. In
particular, analyses that focus on failings of U.S. management
and innovation are inconsistent with the sustained market shares
of U.S. firms. Rather, the data show that the United States has
lost ground as primarily as a locus of production. Differences
in costs are presumably the main factor underlying the shift
abroad by multinational corporations of production activities.
Effective policies to improve U.S. competitiveness must address
the determinants of these costs in order to upgrade the United
States as a site for production.
Implications of the closing gap
While the postwar scientific and technological advances of
Europe and Asia were undeniably impressive, these gains were made
possible in large part by the existence of a technology gap
between the United States and other industrial nations. Even in
those cases where considerations of national security prompted
the United States to limit foreign access to its advanced
technology, scientists abroad were usually able to duplicate U.S.
results at a small fraction of the original cost. Thus, as other
nations achieve parity with the United States in scientific and
technological endeavors, global patterns of innovation and
multinationals came in motor vehicles, not a high-technology
industry by the usual definitions. The largest gain over the
period was in chemicals and allied products, a high-technology
sector.9
dissemination will undergo corresponding changes.
Like other nations, the United States has always derived
substantial benefits from imported scientific and technological
knowledge. In the postwar period, however, the significant U.S.
lead in most areas meant that this source of advance was of only
secondary importance. While catch-up abroad entails painful
adjustments for the U.S. economy, it also means a potential
increase in U.S. gains from technological imports. Although the
specter of other nations closing the technology gap is evidently
distasteful to some nationalistic Americans, over the long term
it offers the opportunity for mutual gains through expanded two-
way trade in new knowledge. Other consequences include greater
U.S. participation in international cooperative research projects
and commercial joint ventures, trends already well underway.
Investments in science and technology
The rapidity with which other industrial nations have
achieved parity with the United States in many scientific and
technological areas raises the question whether one of these
nations (Japan in particular) might soon displace the United
States as the global leader in science and technology. Such
predictions of future national performance are often based on
comparisons of current aggregate spending for R&D. However,
interpretation of these statistics is complicated by at least
four factors: the huge size of the American economy, the
importance of defense-related expenditures in the U.S. total,10
differences in types of support used by the United States and its
major rivals, and the growing R&D activities abroad of U.S.
companies.
Critics of U.S. policy argue that the United States has
fallen behind in research and development, relative both to other
major nations today and to its own past efforts. This assessment
is based largely on comparisons of R&D spending as a share of
gross national product (GNP), a measure that shows other nations
catching up to or even surpassing the United States (see Table
4) .Yetthe United States still spends far more in total than
any other OECD nation, a reflection of the nation's much larger
size.(The Soviet Union, not an OECD member, is estimated to
allocate an amount comparable to that of the United States.)
While R&D spending as a fraction of GNP varies surprisingly
little across the major industrial nations, there are significant
differences in the allocation of funds among alternative uses.
In relation to its major commercial rivals, the United States
skews its R&D resources toward defense projects. In 1984,
defense accounted for two-thirds of total U.S. spending for
research and development, with civil space research taking
another five percent of the total.4
Among the major nations, West Germany and Japan devote the
highest proportion of GNP to nondefense R&D spending (Table 5).
The United States is alone among major nations in its extensive
As a writer for Fortune magazine recently put it, U.S.
research and development is getting too much bang for the buck.11
support of basic research and its almost negligible direct
support of commercial R&D projects. These funding patterns help
to explain why the United States has been able to maintain its
lead in most areas of military technology and basic science but
has lost ground to other nations, particularly Japan, in
translating U.S. scientific advances into commercial gains.
As with production trends, the activities of multinational
corporations blur the distinction between U.S. and foreign R&D.
A significant share of "foreign" R&D is actually performed by
subsidiaries abroad of U.S. firms. One striking example is the
breakthough in superconductivity research that earned the Nobel
prize for two IBM scientists working in the firm's Swiss
laboratories. A similar phenomenon exists for European and
Japanese firms operating in the United States. As foreign
companies establish U.S. subsidiaries, these firms are also
increasing their local R&D activities.5
The Role of Domestic R&D
Recommendations intended to restore the U.S. competitive
edge in high-technology production almost always include measures
to spur domestic R&D. This prescription reflects two implicit
In the past, multinationals typically centralized most
research activities in a single domestic location, undertaking
R&D at locations abroad primarily to tailor products and
processes to local needs. The recent increase in research
undertaken abroad stems in part from cost considerations,
especially labor costs. However, tax and incentive policies of
host governments have become an increasingly important factor in
determining the location of corporate research activities.12
assumptions: first, that more R&D means more innovation and
productivity growth; and second, that these assumed results of
U.S. R&D activity influence mainly domestic productivity growth
and thereby boost U.S. international competitiveness. Yet there
is scant empirical evidence to justify this critical assumed link
between a nation's aggregate R&D and productivity gains relative
to competitors abroad.
In the past, lack of ability to absorb and apply new
knowledge was the major factor preventing foreign firms from
sharing equally in the commercial benefits from U.S. research and
development. Today, however, new technical knowledge is quickly
transmitted abroad and applied by foreign as well as domestic
firms. In particular, subsidiaries abroad of U.S. multinationals
can be expected to enjoy a level of technological advancement
similar to that of the U.S. parent.
Absorptive capacity, rather than national boundaries, is the
key to determining the implications of U.S. research and
development for the international competitiveness of American
producers. On the other hand, U.S. firms can now benefit from
new knowledge resulting from foreign R&D activity. Narrowing of
the technology gap between the United States and other industrial
nations thus means expanded opportunities for two-way trade in
knowledge as well as products. And the recent growth in offshore
research activities of multinational firms further calls into
question the significance of comparisons between U.S. and
"foreign" R&D spending.13
II. Motives for promoting high-technology production
The United States is one among many nations currently
seeking to promote domestic high-technology industries. This
goal of government trade and industrial policies has become
commonplace not only for most of the industrialized nations but
also for many less-developed countries. In some cases, the cost
as conventionally measured of maintaining the sectors in question
appears to be staggering (although perhaps less than for the
ubiquitously sheltered agricultural sectors of industrial
nations). And notwithstanding large expenditures, many such
attempts are ultimately unsuccessful in creating an economically
viable domestic industry. Thus, it is important to identify the
broader objectives the United States and other nations seek to
foster through support of high-technology production.
Policies to raise national income
Economists' theoretical analyses of trade policy usually
assume as a starting point the goal of maximizing national income
(or, more precisely, its present discounted value). On this
basis, there are two fundamental justifications of departures
from laissez-faire, both resting on an assumed divergence of
social and private benefits. The first justification, which
entails gains for one country at the expense of its trading
partners, is the optimum tariff argument. A country that is
large relative to the world market can improve its terms of trade
(the price of its exports relative to that of its imports) by14
restricting the volume of trade; the optimum tariff sets the
level of trade restriction to balance these terms-of-trade gains
against the accompanying reduction in trade volume.
However, the same logic suggests that large suppliers should
shun export subsidies (which would increase industry profits but
lower national income). Since subsidies to production and export
are endemic in high-technology industries, it is safe to conclude
that maximization of national income through terms-of-trade
manipulation is not the relevant consideration underlying support
of these industries.
A recent variant of this reasoning views trade and
industrial policies as means by which a nation can increase its
share of worldwide economic profits ("rents") in oligopolistic
industries.6 As in the case of terms-of-trademanipulation, one
country's gain from such a strategy is likely to mean
corresponding losses abroad. However, the implications for
global efficiency are ambiguous, since the starting point is not
(as in the standard optimal-tariff analysis) a Pareto optimum.
return to this point in Section III below.
Externalities
The second theoretical justification of government
intervention to increase national income requires that a
productive activity generate benefits not fully captured by the
6
For a helpful review of the issues and literature, see
Grossman and Richardson (1985).15
producing firm. Under these conditions, the market-determined
level of the activity may be too low relative to its value to
society, and there is a case on narrow efficiency grounds for a
subsidy to production. However, direct production subsidies are
rarely employed, or even proposed. Rather, the alleged spillover
becomes the basis of an argument for import restrictions or
export incentives. These policies do provide an implicit subsidy
to domestic production, but also an implicit tax on domestic
consumption. Their use can therefore be justified on second-best
grounds if the social benefit from the production subsidy
outweighs the social loss from the consumption tax.
Assumed spillovers or externalities from high-technology
production are frequently cited as the main rationale for
policies to promote these industries (and, recently, more
broadly, to promote any "complex production"). Appeals based on
learning curves, forward linkages, strategic activities, and
maintenance of an industrial base are all updated versions of the
traditional infant-industry argument for protection and subject
to the same qualifications.7
Two important qualifications must be met for protection to
be justified along these lines. First, there must actually k.an
externality. In particular, this means that the mere existence
of learning-by-doing is not enough; it must be impossible for
firms to fully capture these benefits. This could be true
because of problems of technological appropriability or because
The papers in Krugman (1986) offer numerous examples.16
private capital markets are "imperfect' in their ability to
finance large, risky, long-range projects.
In addition, the size of the expected benefit must be
sufficiently great to offset, in present-value terms, the cost of
the policies to produce the benefit. This condition is more
likely to be met if the productive activity can be encouraged
directly rather than through trade intervention, since the latter
entails additional cost. The additional cost is still greater,
and the case for intervention correspondingly weaker, if the
facilitating policy is maintained after the infant has matured.
The externalities argument does seem at least potentially
relevant to the case for government support of high-technology
industries. In particular, the fruits of research and
development may not be captured fully by the innovating firm,
especially in industries such as electronics where the market is
served by a large number of small firms. On the other hand,
there is no clear evidence that, as a consequence of
appropriability problems, firms do in fact engage in a suboptimal
aggregate level of research and development; rivalry among firms
may induce duplicative R&D efforts.
Furthermore, as in any efficiency argument for government
intervention, the potential for a welfare gain from an optimal
policy does not ensure that the actual policies adopted with this
motive will be socially beneficial. And, since the affected
domestic industry almost always benefits from preferential
policies regardless of whether the broader national interest is17
served, an activist trade or industrial policy is likely to
divert substantial industry resources into lobbying. A final
consideration is that policies that promote the growth of
particular high-technology sectors (targeting) or of high-
technology industries as a group will, except in the very long
run, drive up the costs to all users of specialized inputs, e.g.,
the salaries of scientists and engineers.8
Other policy goals
A more basic question concerns the appropriateness of the
assumed ultimate goal used in most economic analyses:
maximization of national income.It is clear that national
policies are shaped by other criteria also, including the
distribution of earned Lncome and the composition of domestic
production. With respect to the former, U.S. policy to a large
extent aims to maintain the status quo, i.e., to slow the process
by which changes in competitive conditions worldwide (whatever
their cause) are translated into corresponding changes in U.S.
earnings or employment patterns.
The second criterion, composition of domestic production,
also figures prominently in national policy making, although it
is rarely stated in this way. Arguments about American
deindustrialization and about the strategic role of particular
industries usually reflect implicit assumptions about the
8For a theoretical analysis of this point, see Dixit
(1985). The same issue is raised by the justification of U.S.
defense and space R&D in terms of commercial spin-offs.18
desirable composition of the nation's output. The national
debate about causes and consequences of "loss of international
competitiveness" has at its heart the question of how the
composition of employment or production ought to be determined.
Also important is that issues of distribution and of industrial
composition are intimately related; an accelerated shift away
from the manufacturing industries (or from mature industries to
newer ones) entails important redistributive consequences by
region, sex, race, education, and union status.
Why promote high-technology industries?
The high-technology manufacturing sector consists of
individual industries, each with its own distinctive economic
features and policy concerns. The common defining feature is the
high share of research and development activities relative to
sales, or of "professional, technical, and kindred" employment
relative to total employment. However, efforts to promote
specifically these industries raise several issues that are much
more important than for other types of industrial policy.
First, these are the industries in which the United States
has had its clear competitive advantage in recent decades and
which together account for the lion's share of U.S. manufactured
exports. Access to superior technology has allowed American
producers to remain internationally competitive despite labor
compensation far higher than in other nations. Thus, there is a
strong belief, both in the United States and elsewhere, that19
high-technology production has been the main cause of the
nation's economic and military strength, and that loss of U.S.
competitiveness in these industries must mean a corresponding
reduction in both the U.S. standard of living and the nation's
military might.
Second, for many high-technology products, R&D expenditures
constitute a substantial fraction of total cost. These large
costs of research and development in turn create significant
economies of scale. Aircraft is an extreme case of this, in
which it is estimated that the total market worldwide can sustain
only two, or perhaps three, profitable firms. Furthermore, once
the R&D costs associated with a given product or process have
been incurred, a private or government-controlled firm may find
it optimal to sell at a price that is well below full average
cost per unit.If firms or nations price in this way, resulting
financial losses to rivals tend to drive some from the industry
and thus curtail future competition and innovation.
Third, both technological barriers to entry (proprietary
technology in the form of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets,
but also absorptive capacity) and pervasive scale economies tend
to restrict the number of competitors worldwide at any given
time. This means economic profits need not be forced to zero
through competition among firms. An additional implication of
limited entry is that, from a social point of view, production
may be too low, i.e., the cost of additional output from the
industry would be more than justified by its value to potential20
consumers.
Finally, these industries are perceived as having important
links to the nation's defense capabilities. In aircraft as well
as semiconductors and computers, past U.S. defense and space
expenditures are credited with an important role in facilitating
the subsequent commercial dominance of the domestic industry in
world markets. But for aircraft, that dominance is threatened
today by the success of the European Airbus consortium, while in
semiconductors and computers, the Japanese have become an
increasingly formidable presence.
Moreover, the implications for the United States of
increased R&D activity abroad are more complicated in industries
with clear links to defense. The economic benefits from one
nation's superior products or processes are typically shared
worldwide through trade, so that the United States is likely to
benefit not only from its own research and development efforts
but also those of other nations. In contrast, the military value
of new products and processes depends critically on their
superiority to what is available elsewhere. From the point of
view of defense, a rival nation's gains must always come at the
expense of the United States.
Although each of these considerations appears to play some
role in shaping national policies toward high-technology
industries, it seems that the last one, broadly conceived, offers
the best explanation for the evident willingness of many nations
to promote these industries even at considerable expense in terms21
of foregone national income. In these industries, world ranking
makes an important difference. For the United States, moving
from first to second means a fundamental adverse shift in the
world strategic balance. For the major economic rivals of the
United States, the challenge to U.S. worldwide preeminance in
high-technology production implies a challenge to U.S. political
and military hegemony as well as to established commercial
interests.
For minor industrial nations (e.g., Sweden, which has its
own national aircraft producer) or for less-developed countries
(e.g., Brazil, which has supported a domestic industry in both
aircraft and computers), it is evident that the motivation must
be somewhat different. Again, however, part of the explanation
may hinge on the implications for the nation's political and
strategic relationship with the United States and other
superpowers. Having a viable domestic industry in, say, aircraft
or computers, elevates a nation from the dependent status of
technological followership, even though the twin goal of
leadership may be, at least for the present, unattainable except
in relation to other minor nations.
In those industries such as aircraft where sellers are few
worldwide, buyers' fears of economic or political exploitation
may be justified. However, in light of the strong incentives for
sellers to supply their products at a price below full average
costs, political costs of dependency seem far more likely than
economic ones. This is particularly true when the United States22
is the relevant external supplier, given the nation's extensive
use of temporary trade embargoes and the very broad definition of
"strategic" importance used in licensing exports with potential
military applications (Jacobsen, 1987).
The economics of high-technology production
Arguments for special treatment of high-technology
industries are usually based in part on the distinctive economic
features of these industries' productive processes and cost
structure. The key role of research and development in these
industries has at least three important implications for the role
of policy.
First, extensive research and development often means a
relatively long period of time between the decision to market a
new product and the first sales of that product, and an even
longer time until the new product "breaks even." In the case of
aircraft, it is estimated that the first positive net cash-flow
associated with a new model occurs five to ten years after the
start of development. In pharmaceuticals, legally mandated
product testing almost always means significant delays in
bringing a new product to market.
A related characteristic of high-technology production is
potentially higher risk than in mature industries. This great
risk entails both technological uncertainty with respect to the
feasibility of producing the planned product and uncertainty
concerning market conditions at the relatively remote date when23
the product is ready for sale. In the case of aircraft, sales
have been affected by unforeseen changes in fuel costs and real
interest rates, noise-abatement policies, and deregulation of the
U.S. industry. For nuclear power, falling energy prices and
conservation have reduced demand, while regulatory difficulties
have led to costs several times greater than originally
proj ected.
Both the long period until profits are realized and the
greater financial risk suggest that, even where the dynamic
benefits could potentially be captured entirely by the innovating
firm, private capital markets may be unwilling to provide the
required financing for major development projects.
Finally, because research and development expenses represent
fixed costs that do not depend on the total volume of output
produced and because of learning curve effects, there are
typically strong economies of scale in production --thecost of
each additional unit produced of a given model will be much lower
than the average cost per unit (which will itself be a decreasing
function of the length of the production run). The firm's
profits will thus depend on its ability to spread fixed costs
over a sufficiently large volume of output. Another consequence
of this cost structure is the incentive to sell products below
full average cost, especially in the early stages of a production
run. This practice may cause special problems when a profit-
motivated firm must compete with government-supported enterprises
abroad.24
The problem of interface
Competition between profit-motivated U.S. firms and
enterprises owned or heavily subsidized by foreign governments is
not a problem unique to high-technology industries. Steel and
ship-building are examples of mature industries in which
governments worldwide have chosen to participate actively,
attempting to mitigate the domestic consequences of secularly
declining demand and global excess capacity. However, the
particular characteristics of high-technology industries make the
problem of interface between a basically market-oriented domestic
industry and competitors underwritten by foreign governments even
more complicated than for other manufacturing activities.
As already noted, foreign governments may see special
reasons for market-share protection of their high-technology
industries. Furthermore, the cost structure of these industries
presents particular problems in maintaining a competitive market.
In light of pervasive scale economies, there are strong economic
incentives for import restrictions, dumping, and export or
production subsidies. As U.S. firms view the situation, the key
economic question is not how many suppliers are needed to meet
world demand for a particular product, but, rather, how many
different manufacturing entities, each competing for a favorable
share of a finite market, can the world industry support?
United States reliance on the market as the major mechanism
for allocating productive resources entails a belief that25
investors should be rewarded for risk-taking through higher-than-
average anticipated profits. In particular, this means the
possibility of losses as well as profits from any given
undertaking. However, high-technology industries pose special
problems because profits earned by U.S. firms are likely to
depend more on actions of governments (both foreign and U.S.)
than on the conventional ingredients of industrial
competitiveness. While as a society we may be comfortable with
lower, profits for an entrepreneur who guesses wrong about tastes,
technology, or costs, it is quite different to say the same about
losses caused primarily by actions of foreign governments. The
long-term survival of the U.S. market-based system may be
threatened if domestic firms must compete on equal terms with
enterprises bankrolled by foreign treasuries.
From the foreign perspective, however, that support may be
deemed necessary in order to avoid economic and political
domination by the United States. In aircraft, computers, and
semiconductors, foreign governments point to the influence of
U.S. military procurement in maintaining the profitability of
U.S. firms. Thus, there are really two aspects of interface:
between profit-oriented and government-underwritten suppliers,
and between defense-related and civilian sales.26
III. Alternative policy regimes
A wide variety of policy measures may be used to enhance the
competitive performance of high-technology industries. Because
these industries are often characterized by oligopolistic rather
than highly competitive markets, because of the important role of
governments both as consumers and as producers, and because
multiple criteria (economic, political, and strategic) are used
in evaluating outcomes, economic theory can offer few firm
guidelines concerning the potential costs and benefits of
policies to promote high-technology production or to protect
national shares in global markets for specific products.9
Rather than attempting here to catalog every possible
outcome -- inany case, an impossible task -- itmay be helpful
to enumerate the most important dimensions along which the
outcomes of alternative policy regimes may be measured.
Specifically, policy outcomes may be judged on the basis of their
effects on market competition (number of firms worldwide and in a
specific market), cost of production, product "variety" available
to consumers, and national share of global economic profits for
the industry.
The last of these is easiest to evaluate. The industries in
question are ones in which positive economic profits (supernormal
profits) may be sustained indefinitely. Therefore, other things
See, however, Grossman and Richardson (1985) for an
excellent account of the ambiguous economic considerations and
references to the relevant technical literature. Dixit and Kyle
(1985) analyze the many possible outcomes in a very simple case
of two countries and two firms.27
equal, a country will benefit from increasing its share of the
market and, thereby, its share of the (relatively fixed) pool of
global profits. Although these gains will arise in the form of
higher profits of the relevant national firms, they will normally
be shared more broadly through factor payments and taxes.
However, one nation's gain in this dimension is necessarily
another nation's loss.
Competition among nations for the fixed total can only
reduce world welfare and may well reduce welfare also for each
competing nation (the latter is not assured, even when all
nations retaliate optimally to their competitors' profit-grabbing
tactics). Because of the certainty of global losses and the
likelihood of national losses from competition of this type,
there is a clear case for international agreements to limit at
least the most obvious forms of it.
Again holding other considerations constant, more firms
serving a given market means more competition and greater
economic efficiency. In this case, however, the gains come in
the form of benefits to consumers from a larger volume of
production and lower price. Economic profits are expected to
decline as the number of competing firms increases, although the
possibility of exit ensures an adequate expected return.
For industries in which the number of firms has no important
relationship to cost per unit or to product variety, more
competing firms will always be economically beneficial. This
suggests that market-share protection has greater expected28
benefits (or lower social costs) when it increases national
firms' share in an integrated global market than when it reserves
a particular segment of the market for its own firms. By this
logic, the Airbus market-competition strategy is preferable from
an efficiency point of view to a restricted-market approach
(along the lines of the U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement) that
achieved the same sales volumes for Airbus and Boeing.
This analysis of competing suppliers would be sufficient in
an industry in which costs were unrelated to the level of output
(constant returns to scale) or tended to increase with the level
of output, and each firm supplied an identical product. For the
high-technology industries, however, neither situation is
typical. Choice among a greater range of related products is
clearly an additional advantage from policies that increase the
number of firms competing to serve a given market. Unfortunately,
the issue of cost per unit tends to cut in the opposite
direction.
With strong static and dynamic economies of scale, a larger
number of firms means higher cost per unit. Ignoring for a
moment the issue of variety, the social optimum would be achieved
with a single producer selling its product at marginal cost.
However, this arrangement requires a subsidy to that firm in
excess of the full cost of research and development. The
distributional and political issues raised by this solution of
the natural-monopoly problem are well known. One possible
compromise is average-cost pricing, typical in public utilities.29
In mature industries, a major problem associated with
regulation of natural monopoly is lack of incentive for cost
minimization and an associated incentive for over-
capitalization. Implementation of either regulatory approach in
high-technology sectors is even more problematic. Complete
underwriting by government of fixed costs uncertain in both size
and technological outcome dilutes the incentives to produce
marketable results at minimum cost. This is true whether the
actual R&D is undertaken by a profit-oriented firm or by a
government agency. Furthermore, government bureaucrats are
thereby placed in the position of making technological and
business judgments about which projects ought to be undertaken.
The history of the U.S. government's role in innovation suggests
that this arrangement virtually guarantees failure (Nelson,
1983).
On the other hand, complete reliance on the market is also
likely to be unsatisfactory, for several reasons. As already
noted, both appropriability and capital-market problems may
prevent the private sector from undertaking some worthwhile
projects. One workable compromise for the United States is to
encourage cooperative ventures in which government support plays
a role, particularly in the "generic" research where
appropriability problems are likely to be greatest, but profit-
oriented enterprises are encouraged to prticipate actively. A
related approach already used in the United States is to
encourage industry R&D indirectly via support for university30
research activities (see Nelson, 1986)
Even these mixed strategies have disadvantages, at least
from a static perspective. One is the high probability of
duplicative R&D effort unless the government limits its support
to just one firm or group per project. But since such limits
would eliminate some of the benefits from fostering private-
government cooperation, this would presumably be the appropriate
choice only where capital costs are very large. Furthermore, to
the extent that the reward to successful innovators comes through
control over eventual output and price, there will still be the
usual incentives to supply a volume of output below the social
optimum. If the quid pro quo for government participation were
some form of mandatory licensing, this problem would be reduced
but not eliminated.
At the international level, exactly the same economic
problem of natural monopoly arises, except that is further
complicated by implications for the national distribution of
super-normal profits already mentioned. In terms of trade
regimes, global productive efficiency is best served (ignoring
the issue of variety) by concentrating production in a single
firm. Efficiencies of scale make market-share protection an
economically rational strategy for any individual country that
has a potentially competitive supplier. But, again, competing
efforts to achieve these economies of scale will actually result
in the opposite: high-cost production from an excessively large
number of competing suppliers worldwide. Here the case is even31
stronger for international rules limiting policies to capture
scale economies for national producers.
Furthermore, there are potential efficiency gains from
measures that encourage international cooperative ventures among
firms serving a given national market. As long as national
policies toward trade allow the world to remain in effect a
single integrated market, possible losses from a reduced number
of competitors are likely to be more than offset by supply-side
savings. This suggests that market-segmentation strategies
implemented by tariffs, quotas, voluntary exports restraints, or
other bilateral agreements are inferior on efficiency grounds to
production or export subsidies that have the same effect on the
number of surviving competitors.32
IV.U.S.prospects and options
The evidence on recent U.S. performance in high-technology
industries is mixed. Some alleged U.S. problems simply reflect
the postwar recovery and technological catch-up of other nations,
i.e., a return to normal conditions from highly atypical ones.
But if the nation's competititiveness problems have been
exaggerated, it is nonetheless clear that the era of unquestioned
U.S. economic hegemony is over. Today, Japan and the European
Community rival the United States in important dimensions of
economic achievement. Yet the United States remains the
acknowledged leader of the western alliance in both economic and
security matters. One possible reason is the apparent reluctance
of other economically powerful nations, specifically Japan and
West Germany, to assume the burdens and costs of an active
leadership role. That reluctance may be another legacy of the
unique circumstances that propelled the United States into its
postwar hegemonic role.
The decline of the U.S. technological lead entails important
changes in the economic relationship between the United States
and its major trading partners. As these nations become more
similar in terms of technology base, abundance of capital and
skilled labor, and per capita income, intra-industry trade is
likely to grow. In particular, two-way trade in technology and
in technology-based services should become increasingly important
as other nations move from adaptation into innovation. And in
the mature industries and even some that are now considered33
"high-technology" sectors, all the industrial market economies
will be squeezed by a new tier of competitors in Asia and
elsewhere.
Likewise, for all the industrial economies, problems of
sectoral adjustment will continue to generate strong pressures
for import protection and other forms of assistance to industries
losing ground to newcomers, Contrasting national approaches to
the nurturing of high-technology production will remain a major
source of sectoral trade conflict between the United States and
its trading partners.
Simple policy prescriptions are unlikely to emerge from any
analysis that captures the important features of high-technology
production and international competition. Nonetheless, some
broad guidelines for policy do emerge. The key distinguishing
features of alternative policy regimes are the number of
competing firms in a given market or worldwide, cost efficiency,
product variety, and national distribution of economic profits.
These considerations suggest the utility of international
agreements that limit counterproductive efforts to increase any
one nation's share of world production in a specific industry,
whether to get a larger share of economic profits or to capture
greater economies of scale. They also imply that tiarket-share
protection is more likely to be deleterious to world and national
welfare when it segments the international market. Import
barriers or explicit turf agreements are thus less desirable than
production or export subsidies. This is a particularly34
interesting conclusion in light of current GATT rules, which
allow import barriers and at least tacitly accept turf agreement
but actively discourage the use of subsidies. Similarly, U.S.
trade law contains explicit provision for countervailing any
foreign subsidy but has been less successful in combatting the
greater damage resulting from foreign barriers to imports.1°
Finally, it is evident that potential world and national
gains are greatest from policies that encourage international
cooperation in high-technology ventures while limiting the
potential harm from reduced competition among suppliers by
maintenance of an integrated world market.
Can the United States maintain its lead? Should it try?
Many Americans are reluctant to accept a future in which the
United States is but one among several leaders in the high-
technology industries. By redoubling its efforts, could the
United States return to its one-time position of unquestioned
technological preeminence? Even with vastly increased resources
allocated to research and development, this kind of advantage
probably can no longer be sustained -- bythe United States or
any other country -- ina world that has become highly
interdependent, and in which many nations command the physical
10
"Reciprocity" trade legislation now under consideration
in the United States has never, to my knowledge, been justified
in terms of its potential contribution to maintaining integrated
world markets. Of course, bilateral, product-by-product
reciprocity would probably lead to market-share agreements rather
than open markets.35
and human resources necessary to participate in research and
production at the technological frontiers. The advantage gained
by being first in any innovation, whether for a firm or for a
nation, is likely to be short-lived, thanks to the greatly
increased speed with which new technical knowledge now becomes
available to potential competitors all over the globe.
But even if it cannot succeed, the U.S. effort to maintain
technological leadership is likely to have important positive
consequences, not only for the United States but for its trading
partners as well. Research and development and the resulting
scientific and technological advances will continue to provide
the primary basis for economic growth and a rising standard of
living. Vigorous competition, whether among firms or among
nations, can quicken the pace of technological advance worldwide
and thus enhance economic prospects both at home and abroad.REFERENCES
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U.S. TRADE BALANCE IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY AND NON-HIGH-TECHNOLOGY




Year Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance
1970 10.3 4.2 6.1 19.0 22.8 -3.8
1971 11.4 4.9 6.5 19.0 27.4 -8.4
1972 11.9 6.3 5.6 21.8 33.7 11.9
1973 15.9 7,9 8.0 28.8 39.8 11.0
1974 21.5 9.8 11.7 42.0 49.7 -7.7
1975 22.9 9.5 13.4 48.1 45.5 2.6
1976 25.6 13.2 12.4 51.6 56.4 -4.8
1977 27.3 15.3 12.0 52.9 66.6 -13.7
1978 34.5 20.1 14.4 59.5 86.7 -27.2
1979 43.1 22.5 20.6 77.9 96.3 -18.4
1980 54.2 27.7 26.6 95.0 104.2 -9.2
1981 59.9 33.5 26.6 100.7 115.7 -15.0
1982 57.6 34.1 23.4 89.8 116.5 -26.7
1983 59.7 40.9 18.8 79.9 129.9 -59.0
1984 65.0 58.7 16.2 86.2 173.2 -87.0
1985 68.4 64.8 3.6 93.5 204.6 -111.0
Note: Based on U.S. Department of Commerce DOC-3 definition of
high-technology products. Data for 1970-1977 are estimates.
Sources: National Science Foundation (1986, p. 54); U.S.
Department of Commerce (1986, p. 131).Table 2.
WORLD EXPORT SHARES OF TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE PRODUCTS, 1965-1984
(percent)
Country 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1982 1984
United States 27.5 27.0 24.5 22.9 23.0 24.7 25.1 25.2
Japan 7.3 10.9 11.6 14.3 17.4 16.2 17.8 20.2
France 7.3 7.1 8.4 8.5 7.9 8.3 7.7 7.7
West Germany 16.9 16.8 16.8 16.3 14.8 15.5 15.0 14.5
Tntted Kingdom 12.0 9.8 9.6 10.8 9.0 9.4 8.7 8.5
Note: Technology-intensive products defined as those for which R&D
expenditures exceed 2.36 percent of value-added (DOC-2/OECD definition).
Source: National Science Foundation (1986, p. 58).Table 3.
WORLD EXPORT SHARES OF TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE PRODUCTS, 1984
(percent)
United West United
Product field States Japan GermanyFrance Kingdom
Aircraft & parts 45.1 0.5 15.2 11.8 14.5
Industrial inorganic
chemicals 23.9 4.3 15.0 11.5 12.2
Radio & TV receiving
equipment 0.5 79.5 8.2 1.0 2.2
Office & computing
machines 35.5 19.1 9.2 5.6 9.5
Electrical machinery
& equipment 23.9 19.3 17.3 8.2 9.2
C ommunicat ions
equipment 26.5 35.5 10.4 6.1 6.4
Professional &
scientific instruments 13.7 31.2 15.3 5.7 7.4
Drugs 19.6 2.6 15.8 10.7 11.9
Plastic materials,
synthetics 14.4 10.1 21.4 9.5 6.9
Engines & turbines 29.0 17.4 16.4 1.9 8.7
Agricultural
chemicals 33.7 4.1 13.0 7.2 7.2
Note: Technology-intensive products defined as those for which R&D
expenditure exceeds 2.36 percent of value-added (DOC-2/OECD definition).
Source: National Science Foundation (1986, p. 60).Note: Data for 1983 and 1984 are preliminary; data for 1985 are
estimates.
Source: National Science Foundation (1986, p. 4)
Table 4.
NATIONALR&D EXPENDITURES AS ASHARE OF GNP, 1961-1985
(percent)
West United
France Germany Japan Kingdom
United
States U.S.S.R. Year
1961 1.4 NA 1.4 2.5 2.7 NA
1962 1.5 1.2 1.5 NA 2.7 2.6
1963 1.6 1.4 1.4 NA 2.8 2.8
1964 1.8 1.6 1.5 2.3 2.9 2.9
1965 2.0 1.7 1.5 NA 2.8 2.9
1966 2.1 1.8 1.5 2.3 2.8 2.9
1967 2.1 2.0 1.5 2.3 2.8 2.9
1968 2.1 2.0 1.6 2.3 2.8 NA
1969 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.3 2.7 3.0
1970 1.9 2.1 1.9 NA 2.6 3.3
1971 1.9 2.2 1.9 NA 2.4 3.5
1972 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.3 3.7
1973 1.8 2.1 1.9 NA 2.3 3.8
1974 1.8 2.1 2.0 NA 2.2 3.7
1975 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.2 3.8
1976 1.8 2.2 1.9 NA 2.2 3.6
1977 1.8 2.1 1.9 NA 2.1 3.5
1978 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 3.5
1979 1.8 2.4 2.1 NA 2.2 3.6
1980 1.8 2.5 2.2 NA 2.3 3.8
1981 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 3.7
1982 2.1 2.6 2.5 NA 2.5 3.7
1983 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.6 3.8
1984 2.2 2.5 2.6 NA 2.6 3.9






NONDEFENSE R&D EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GNP,1971-1985
Year France Germany Japan
1971 1.5 2.0 1.8 NA 1.6
1972 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.6
1973 1.4 1.9 1.9 NA 1.6
1974 1.5 2.0 2.0 NA 1.6
1975 1.5 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.6
1976 1.4 2.0 1.9 NA 1.6
1977 1.4 2.0 1.9 NA 1.6
1978 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.6
1979 1.4 2.3 2.1 NA 1.7
1980 1.4 2.3 2.2 NA 1.8
1981 1.5 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.8
1982 1.6 2.5 2.5 NA 1.9
1983 1.7 2.4 2.6 L6 1.9
1984 1.8 2.4 2.6 NA 1.8
1985 1.8 2.5 NA NA 1.9
Note: Data for 1983 and 1984 are preliminary; datafor1985are
estimates.
Source: National Science Foundation (1986, p. 6)